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ANSWERS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:
THE TRADE RIGHT ENFORCEMENT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
American businesses estimate that global trade in pirated and
counterfeited goods is a $250 billion a year industry.' The
International Intellectual Property Alliance ("IIPA") estimated that
global piracy cost the United States copyright industry $13 billion
in 2004.2The global piracy industry is centered largely in heavily
populated, developing countries such as China, India, Russia, and
Brazil.3 To reduce these extraordinary levels of piracy, the United
States must work to reduce the ease with which foreign copyright
infringement goes unpunished. In order to accomplish this task of
protecting copyright rights abroad, two elements must be in place.4
First, a legal framework must set forth a copyright owner's rights
and the procedures by which those rights will be enforced.5
Second, the legal framework and procedural enforcement
guidelines must be applied in a manner that assures copyright
holders of their rights.6
While the world has seen tremendous growth in the adoption of
legal frameworks by developing countries, the laws are only as
good as their enforcement.7 Unfortunately, the enforcement of
these frameworks is often extremely poor.8 What follows is an
1. Laurie J. Flynn, U.S. Discloses Move to Stop Piracy of Intellectual Property,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at 7.
2. Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing on Piracy] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
3. Flynn, supra note 1.
4. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
345
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examination of the recently adopted legal frameworks as well as
the identification of several obstacles that stand in the way of
effective enforcement in China. This Article will focus on the
relevant provisions of the Trade Right Enforcement Act (the
TREA), currently before the Senate, which are designed to monitor
China's compliance with its international obligations to protect
intellectual property rights. According to the TREA, if the
Executive Branch deems that China has failed to meet the goals set
forth in the TREA, or has failed to take significant steps toward
attaining those goals, the President may begin collecting evidence
against China to be used in an action against it before the World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Board (DSB).9
This article is a policy argument concerning an international
intellectual property issue. The background section details several
relevant topics: U.S.-China relations; China's political, legal, and
economic environment; the TREA's provisions; and the history
and structure of the WTO. The analysis will focus on the TREA's
shortcomings and in particular, the economic and political realities
that doom the plan from the outset. Further, the Article will
analyze potential alternative methods of compelling Chinese
compliance. Finally, it will suggest steps U.S. companies and
artists can take to help ensure protection of their IP assets in
China.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will examine the relevant historical and political
background necessary to understand U.S.-China relations. It is
comprised of three parts which focus on U.S.-China trade, political
and cultural relations. A final section paints the current political
and legal climate within China in broad strokes.
A. U.S. -China Trade Relations
China, once an insignificant blip on the United States' trade
radar, is now the U.S.'s third largest trading partner."° In fact, over
9. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. (2005).
10. 151 CONG. REC. H6658 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep.
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the past tweffty-five years, trade between the U.S. and China has
risen from $5 billion to $231 billion." As U.S.-China trade has
grown, so has the U.S. trade deficit with China.' 2 In 2004, the
trade gap with China was $162 billion.'3 This massive trade deficit
is already the world's largest bilateral gap. 4 The problem appears
to be compounding at an alarming rate; some 2005 estimates
projected that the gap could grow to as much as $225 billion.'5 To
put this figure in perspective, consider that the total U.S. trade
deficit is expected to approach $700 billion for that same year. 16
Several factors contribute to the deficit; major areas of concern
have been identified.' 7 These include intellectual property rights,
agricultural services, industrial policies, trading rights and
distribution, and transparency of trade laws.'8
China's economic growth rates are among the highest in the
world. 9 Many Americans have thus begun accusing China of
stealing U.S. jobs, keeping their currency undervalued by pegging
it to the dollar, dumping goods on foreign markets, and violating
workers' rights to continue to keep labor costs down.2" The
debates have become heated; growing concerns about China's
failure to revalue its currency against the dollar have tempted U.S.
officials to formally label China a "currency manipulator."2'
These words may not be toothless: they "could resurrect a
Putnam).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 151 CONG. REC. H6558, 6659 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of
Rep. McGovern).
14. Id. at 6666 (statement of Rep. Putnam).
15. Id.
16. Edmund L. Andrews, I.MF. Warns of Imbalance in World Consumption,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at 3.
17. Id. (citing Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], World Economic Outlook (Sept.
14, 2005)).
18. Id. (citing Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], World Economic Outlook (Sept.
14, 2005)).
19. Neil C. Hughes, A Trade War With China?, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug.
2005, at 94.
20. Id. See infra part V(A) for an analysis of the merits of some of these
claims.
21. Looming Trade War, BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2005, at 14A.
347
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congressional move to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on all Chinese
goods... [which] could well lead to a global recession. 22 At the
same time, China's purchases of U.S. treasury bonds have been
instrumental in allowing the U.S. government and taxpayers to
continue spending.23 A sudden devaluation of China's currency,
coupled with a rapid flight of its reserves from the dollar, could
send U.S. interest rates soaring and result in a "hard landing for
many Americans.
24
As a result of these complex economic issues, Congress is
divided over policies regarding trade. The struggle over the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which is
designed to relieve trade restrictions between the U.S. and six
Central American countries, demonstrates the rift in Congress
between free-traders and protectionists. 5 When CAFTA was
before Congress, protectionists-also called trade skeptics-were
fighting a battle to limit trade on two fronts.26 First, they sought to
raise barriers against China.27 Second, they attempted to keep
barriers against Central America in place.28 Many protectionists
blame China and its exchange rate for the U.S. trade deficit, and
wish to impose trade barriers to prevent the growth of those
deficits.29 Additionally, if protectionists allowed CAFTA to pass,
it might embolden trade liberals to further expand free trade at the
next round of WTO negotiations; a goal clearly in opposition to
protectionist interests.30
Pushing CAFTA through Congress was high on the Bush
Administration's agenda in the spring and summer of 2005, and
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Leon Hadar, Cafta Vote Plays Chinese Bogey, Bus. TIMES SING., Aug. 3,
2005. (noting the six Central American countries that are party to the
Agreement: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and The
Dominican Republic).
26. China-bashing and Trade: Putting Up the Barricades, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 23, 2005 at 29.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
348
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this was to China's detriment.3' In order to appease protectionists
that were angry over CAFTA, the Administration imposed
'safeguard quotas' on seven categories of Chinese textiles.32 An
article in the Economist summed up this move: "The Bush
administration's decision to impose safeguards was taken both to
placate a rising chorus of anti-Chinese fervor in Congress and to
drum up legislative support for CAFTA."33 The Administration
claimed that failure to increase economic ties with Central
America would allow China to expand its economic and political
influence over the region.34 This strategy eventually paid off for
Bush; CAFTA passed through Congress in July of 2005. 3" But, it
had other repercussions as well; in response, China scrapped
export tariffs that were designed to limit the trade gap by
stemming the flow of textiles into the U.S.36 Indeed, the U.S. must
be miindful of this delicate balance when it attempts to solve the
problems of the piracy and counterfeiting of intellectual property.
As is frequently the case in foreign relations, the issue is a single
piece in the large, complicated puzzle of U.S.-China relations.
B. Political Relations Between the United States and China
Henry Kissinger once offered this prediction: "Once China
becomes strong enough to stand alone, it might discard us. A little
later it might even turn against us, if its perception of its interests
requires it."37 In the mid-1980's, the U.S. and China viewed each
other as strategic partners, united by the common goal of
preventing Soviet domination of the Asian continent.38 Since the
fall of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Cold War, the world
31. Textile-trade Politics: A Knotty Problem, THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 2005
at 72.
32. Id.
33. Id. See infra Part IV C for a discussion on safeguard measures.
34. Hadar, supra note 25.
35. Trade Policy: Another Such Victory, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 2005 at
66.
36. A Knotty Problem, supra note 31.
37. RICHARD BERNSTEIN & Ross H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH
CHINA 22 (1998) (quoting Henry Kissinger).
38. Idat 3.
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has entered a new era of international relations and world
politics--that of globalization. 9 While the Cold War's defining
characteristic was division, the new system of globalization is
defined by integration.4 ° This integration has led to increasingly
complicated relations between nation-states; the new system "is
built around. . . balances, which overlap and affect one another."'
To be sure, U.S. relations with China reflect these complexities.
The U.S. is a global leader in economics, culture, technology,
and military power.42 China needs a close relationship with the
U.S. if its modernization efforts are to succeed.43 Similarly, U.S.
interests require a close political relationship with China.44 Noted
economist Wang Jisi has explained: "The United States now needs
China's help on issues such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation,
the reconstruction of Iraq, and the maintenance of stability in the
Middle East."45 Wang concludes that Washington will be slow to
regard Beijing as its primary security threat, and that China will
continue to avoid antagonizing the U.S. for years to come.46
The true picture of U.S.-China political relations, however, is
decidedly more complex.47 The issue of Taiwan, for example,
remains a significant point of controversy between the two
countries.48 The issue of Taiwanese independence has been at the
forefront of the political differences between the U.S. and China
for more than half a century.49 In 1949, when China's nationalist
party leader Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland to escape the
victorious communist party, he brought with him a million
Nationalist troops and a large part of the Kuomintang
39. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 7 (2000).
40. Id at 8.
41. Id.
42. Wang Jisi, China's Search for Stability With America, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 39.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id at 40.
47. See generally id.
48. Wang Jisi, supra note 42, at 46.
49. BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 37, at 22.
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bureaucracy." Chiang's new government reformed and stimulated
the island's economy; today, Taiwan is one of Asia's greatest
economic players.5 Taiwan remains something of a thorn in the
side of the mainland Chinese government, which insists that
Taiwan is part of China. 2 The mainland government's position is
that Taiwan is a part of China and its status is therefore an internal
matter. " But Taiwan is a major trading partner and political ally
of the United States.54  The U.S. has stated its opposition to
Taiwanese independence but has simultaneously asked the
mainland government to talk directly with Taiwan's leader Chen
Shui-bian.55 While the majority of the Taiwanese people oppose a
move for complete independence, powerful separatist groups in
Taiwan continue to push for greater separation from the
mainland. 6 The Taiwan issue is the critical controversy in U.S.-
China political relations and a major confrontation over this issue
would be a grave disaster for everyone involved. 7
C. U.S. -China Cultural Relations
A great divide exists between the United States and China with
respect to the balance of cultural trade. 8 In the past decade,
China's copyright imports have increased 57% annually, while
their progress in copyright exports has been minimal. 9 According
to the Yearbook of China's Publishing Industry 2004, China's
import-to-export ratio with respect to copyrights was a dismal 10.3
to 1.60 For example, in 2003, China imported 12,516 copyrighted
50. Id.
51. MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
PACIFIC ASIA, 355 (2d ed. 1998).
52. Id. at 400.
53. Wang Jisi, supra note 42 at, 46.
54. BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 37, at 150.
55. Wang Jisi, supra note 42, at 46.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. China's Cultural Trade Deficit on the Rise, (April 15, 2005), available at
http://www.beijingportal.com.cn (last visited April 1, 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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books and exported only 81 " Additionally, in areas where China
does compete quantitatively, it still fails economically.62 While the
China National Publication Import and Export Corporation
(CNPIEC) imported and exported roughly the same number of
audio and video products, the price of the imported products was
significantly higher than the price of those exported.63 This
anomaly may be due in large part to the fact that Chinese audio
and video exports "are old fashioned and poorly packaged by
international standards."64
On one hand, it is difficult to cultivate an active intellectual
property industry without proper protections in place.65 On the
other hand, because piracy provides jobs and is a major source of
income in developing countries, there is little incentive to install
the necessary protections.66 This point was addressed in a June
2005 hearing on Capitol Hill concerning piracy in China:
[China has] a conundrum going on where they're
attempting to enforce their laws, but at the same
time they're attempting to enforce public policy of
creating jobs. . .And the two are colliding in such a
way that the reparations you can get through the
legal system aren't too spectacular. . .Even if [a
monetary award] did occur, a new company could
open up with the same people, perhaps the same
address, manufacture the same [counterfeit]
product.67
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. China's Cultural Trade Deficit on the Rise, supra note 58.
65. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
66. Id.
67. Finding and fighting Fakes Reviewing the Strategy Targeting Organized
Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management, the Fed Workforce and the District of Columbia of the S.
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Jeffrey Evans, President and CEO of the Will-Burt Company)
(discussing counterfeiting as it relates to Patent and Trademark infringement).
8
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Some developing countries believe that by paying for legitimate
copies they are simply giving away money.68 Current estimates
suggest that as much as 90% of the music and movies sold in
China are illegal copies.69 This figure begs the question: what
incentives are there for Chinese companies to get involved in the
creative industries?
D. Inside China
China's rapid economic development over the past several
decades has contributed directly to serious, domestic political
failures.7" Elizabeth Economy, a noted expert on China, has
addressed this point: "[China has] ignored the political and
institutional changes necessary to ensure that markets function
smoothly and transparently and that the social challenges arising
from economic reform are addressed effectively."'" These failures,
coupled with the dramatic influx of capital, have contributed to
widespread corruption and a weak social welfare system.72 A poll
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
indicates that between 75% and 80% of Chinese citizens believe
their local politicians are prone to corruption. 73  The Chinese
people, however, are not willing to sit idly by and watch
corruption take over.7 So, the coming years may well be defined
by dramatic changes in China's political system as well as cultural
climate, as reform is pushed forward.75
Major problems exist in China's domestic legal system that
forestall the enforcement of intellectual property rights.76 But to
68. Id.
69. Flynn, supra note 1.
70. Elizabeth Economy, Don't Break the Engagement, FOREIGN AFF., May-
June 2004, at 96.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Ying Tuo, Dragon Int'l Patent Office, Presentation at DePaul University
College of Law: Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property in China
from a Chinese Litigation Perspective (Oct. 20, 2005).
9
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understand why, a basic understanding of the current Chinese
intellectual property enforcement system is necessary. China uses
a two-prong system to enforce intellectual property rights." The
first prong, or the administrative prong, focuses on evidence
gathering.78 The second prong involves the prosecution of the
alleged pirates.79Although the two prongs are not mutually
exclusive, they must be viewed separately in order to get a better
understanding of the system.
The administrative system consists of local bureaus and offices
assigned to the protection of trademark, copyright and patent rights
respectively.8" The principal purpose of the administrative branch
is the gathering of evidence."1 Under Chinese law, there is no
mandatory discovery in the litigation process.8 2 As a result, upon
the receipt of a complaint or even informal notice that they will be
prosecuted, a Chinese criminal piracy ring may simply destroy all
the evidence of their crimes without the risk of facing penalties for
such action.83 The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to collect
evidence before bringing a cause of action.84 Because this burden
is so heavy; administrative offices have the authority to act quickly
to raid suspected piracy operations and seize crucial evidence. 5
The plaintiff may then use that evidence in court in support of an
order comparable to a preliminary injunction to stop the piracy
ring." Any action that arises following this administrative action
will be viewed by the court de novo, thereby increasing the burden
on plaintiffs.87
The Chinese legal system differs greatly from that of the U.S.
and warrants some consideration. There are four hierarchical
levels of courts in the Chinese Judiciary: Supreme People's Court,
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ying Tuo, supra note 74.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
10
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High People's Court, Intermediate People's Court and Basic
People's Court.8 Unlike the U.S. court system, the Chinese
system provides that certain types of cases may bypass lower level
courts and be heard for the first time in higher courts.89 The
Chinese legal system quantitatively limits appeals; they allow for
only one appeal following the first hearing of the case.9" This
appeal will be heard by the next highest level in the court system.9"
At first glance, the Chinese system offers what appears to be a
quite lucrative damage structure.9 2 Damages may include losses
suffered by the owner, profits made by the infringer, royalty
payments, attorney fees, and statutory damages up to $60,000. 93
The system limits a plaintiffs ability to collect substantial
damages by tying court's fees to the awards; the larger the
damages awarded, the larger the fees the plaintiff must pay to the
court.94
The Chinese legal system has undergone significant reform in
the 30 years since the death of Mao Zedong.95 The reform has
centered on establishing an accountable regulatory environment
with better defined laws and better trained lawyers and judges.96
Economy states that "[s]ince 1978, the number of lawyers in China
has skyrocketed from 2,000 to 120,000, and more than 230 law
schools are now training 80,000 future lawyers. 97 Additionally,
Chinese judges are receiving more formal legal training and are no
longer ordinary citizens and retired army officials.98 The push
88. Ying Tuo, supra note 74.
89. Id. For example, IP cases begin in the Intermediate People's Courts, and
patent cases may start in even higher courts. The justification here may be that
the higher courts are better equipped to handle high level and complex legal
issues, while lower courts may lack the requisite sophistication, especially those
courts located in rural areas.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Figures are given in U.S. dollars.
94. Id.
95. Economy, supra note 68.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
11
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toward better legal education may have great effect.99 Indeed, the
next phase of legal reform in China is expected to challenge basic
assumptions about individual rights and the government's
accountability in the court system, and it will be undoubtedly
controversial. 0 It may nonetheless prove extremely successful in
ushering in a new era of increased human rights and decreased
political corruption.'
III. TRADE RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT ACT
In an attempt to bring members into the international legal
framework for copyright protection, the WTO incorporated the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) into
its charter.' 2 The TRIPS agreement sets forth minimum protection
standards by which each member country must abide.0 3 TRIPS is
essentially an amalgam of previous international agreements on
intellectual property rights, including the agreements of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Paris Convention), and
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Berne Convention). 4 Additionally, TRIPS added several
provisions dictating obligations where the incorporated treaties
were insufficient or silent."5
TRIPS advances intellectual property rights by setting forth
minimum standards of protection for which each country is
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Economy, supra note 68.
102. PETER VAN DEN BosSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2005). (noting that developed countries advocated
the inclusion of TRIPS in the WTO).
103. A More Detailed Overiew of the TRIPS Agreement. Published by the
World Trade Organization Available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/intel2_e.htm (last visited April 1,
2006).
104. Id. (noting that the Berne Convention's provision on Moral Rights are
excluded from the TRIPS Agreement).
105. Id.
356
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responsible. °6 WTO member countries are subject to the WTO's
dispute settlement procedures for conflicts that arise from
intellectual property disputes.1 7 As a result of this framework,
American creative industries have better opportunities to sell their
products and services abroad because, as United States Register of
Copyrights Marybeth Peters stated, "[the frameworks] generate
incentive[s] to create and distribute new and better works for the
benefit of Americans and the world. It also creates jobs both here,
and abroad." 108
In 1983, the U.S. and China established the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), a bilateral forum
charged with the task of discussing and working to resolve
problems with bilateral trade and investment policy and its
implementation.0 9 Through the JCCT, China has made a number
of commitments to enforce foreign intellectual property rights."0
These commitments include, inter alia, an increase in domestic
criminal prosecutions for piracy crimes, a reduction in the export
of infringing goods, improvements in the coordination of China's
national police force, and an increase in cooperation with foreign
law enforcement authorities."' China also agreed to enhance its
protection of pirated movies and audio-visual products by
dedicating enforcement teams to pursue pirates and instruct
national enforcement officers on the nature of pirated material." 2
The TRIPS agreement is the first international intellectual
property agreement to focus so much attention on enforcement."3
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
109. Rui-Ruenn Chen, U.S.-China Trade: Trends and Prospects; Includes
Related Article on U.S. -China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, Bus.
AM., Jan. 25, 1993, at 6.
110. The U.S. -China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT)
Outcomes on Major U.S. Trade Concerns, (2005) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2005/TheUSChinaJoin
t Commission on Commerce Trade_(JCCT) Outcomes on MajorUSTrade
Concerns.html?ht= (last visited April 15, 2006).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
357
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In addition to setting forth enforcement obligations covering
policing, customs, and judicial enforcement, the TRIPS agreement
provides for the standard application of criminal penalties for
willful copyright infringers.ll 4 But even with the adoption of these
standards, many problems of application remain." 5
Problems with enforcement generally arise in two ways." 6 First,
a lack of domestic police and court competency prevents proper
enforcement." 7  Second, a lack of political will and economic
incentive contribute to serious enforcement problems in
developing countries." 8
In an attempt to compel Chinese performance with respect to
their international trade obligations under the WTO and the JCCT,
Congress has added provisions to the TREA that set forth
guidelines for Chinese compliance and provide for executive
action if those guidelines are not met.' The TREA passed in the
House on July 27' 2005, and is currently pending in the Senate. 20
Section 5 of the act charges the United States Trade Representative
and the Secretary of Commerce with the task of ensuring that
China has implemented a number of measures toward complying
with its obligations under TRIPS, the JCCT, and other
agreements. 2' The measures are specifically articulated in the
statute and include provisions requiring an increase in the
prosecution of violators, procedural reform designed to speed up
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(1) (2005).
120. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. (2005).
121. Id. The Act states that:
In accordance with the terms of the Agreement of WTO
Accesssion for the People's Republic of China, subsequent
agreements by the Chinese authorities through the U.S.-China
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), and other
obligations by Chinese officials related to its trade obligations,
the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of
Commerce shall undertake to ensure that the Government of
the People's Republic of China has taken the following steps.
14
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the prosecution process, procedural reform to increase
prosecutorial oversight by the government, and the improvement
of bilateral communications with the U.S. 122 The TREA provides
for executive action if the goals are not met.' 23  Specifically, it
provides that if the President determines China has not complied
with the measures provided in §§ A-N, or taken steps that result in
"significant improvement" of intellectual property protection, the
President may appoint a committee to collect evidence to be used
against China in a WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding.'24
The TREA was the subject of a lively debate in the House of
Representatives before it was passed. 125 Proponents argued that it
would establish an effective monitoring system to track China's
compliance with regard to intellectual property rights. 126  They
argue that these reporting systems would provide the transparency
that has been lacking in the area. 1
27
Opponents have argued, among other things, that the act was not
been given proper consideration in the House. 128 Representative
James P. McGovern stated, "[The] bill. . .has never gone before
committee, never had a hearing, never had the benefit of expert
testimony, never had a markup, and has never been open to
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(2) (2005)
The Act states that:
If the President determines that the People's Republic of
China has not met each of the obligations described in
subparagraph (A) through (N) or taken steps that result in
significant improvements in protection of intellectual property
rights in accordance with its trade obligations, then the
President shall assign such resources as are necessary to
collect evidence of such trade agreement violations for use in
dispute settlement proceedings against China in the World
Trade Organization.
Id. For information on the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, See infra Section
IV E.
125. 151 Cong. Rec. H6558, 6559 (daily ed. July 27, 2005).
126. Id. (statement of Rep. Putnam).
127. Id.
128. Id. (statement of Rep. McGovern).
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amendment."' 29 McGovern did not end his criticism there: "[T]he
Chinese Government," he remarked, "must be laughing with glee
at the Republican leadership's blatant abuse of power in their lock-
step rejection of democratic debate.' 3' The TREA's opponents
proposed a series of amendments but they were blocked from a
vote by the majority.13 '
IV. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The TREA allows the U.S. to bring an action against China in
the WTO's dispute settlement framework.32  Before it may be
judged on its merits, it is essential to outline the basic history,
structure and functioning of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB).
A. The Origins of the WTO
The history of the WTO provides keys to understanding its
structure. Following World War II, there was a movement among
world leaders to establish an international body charged with
overseeing the expansion of free trade among nations. 133  The
initial creation, the International Trade Organization, died a "still-
birth" largely due to opposition in the U.S. Senate.'34 The failure
of the organization paved the way for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which continues to play an
129. Id.
130. Id. Rep McGovern is referring to the lack of Congressional debate
regarding the Act and the blockage of attempts by the minority to propose
substantial amendments to the Act that would arguably give it more teeth. Id.
Rep McGovern continued, "the Committee on Rules has become a place where
democracy comes to die. Heaven forbid that this House might actually have a
real debate on these matters and heaven forbid that the Republican Majority
might actually allow votes on these serious unfair trade practices." Id.
131. 151 Cong. Rec. H6558, 6559 (daily ed. July 27, 2005).
132. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109 th Cong. §5(2) (2005).
133. VAN DEN BOsSCHE, supra note 100, at 78-9.
134. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 498 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds. Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2003).
360
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instrumental role in building world trade. 35 The goal of GATT is,
simply stated, to promote trade liberalization by eliminating tariffs
and other forms of trade restrictions, including quotas and
quantitative trade restrictions. 3 6 GATT assigned four principal
obligations to its members:
On joining GATT [member-states] undertook to (1)
apply trade barriers on a nondiscriminatory basis;
(2) limit tariffs on items at the levels set forth in the
GATT tariff schedule; (3) refrain from
circumventing trade concessions through the use of
other barriers to trade; and (4) settle trade conflicts
via consultation and special dispute resolution
process. "'
In order to facilitate the advancement of the first of these four
obligations, GATT set forth two principles fundamental to the
achievement of nondiscrimination.'38 The first, most favored
nation treatment (MFN), prohibits discrimination between goods
from different foreign states.'39 Professor Peter Van den Bossche,
a former Counsellor to the Appellate Body of the WTO, stated that
"[t]he principal purpose of MFN treatment obligations is to ensure
equality of opportunity to import from, or to export to all WTO
members."' 4 The second principle, national treatment obligation,
prohibits discrimination against goods from foreign states.' 4' By
contrast, MFN obligations prohibit discrimination between foreign
states, while national treatment obligations prevent discrimination
against a foreign state in favor of domestic producers."'
Several exceptions to GATT's nondiscrimination rules do
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 310. (citing Appellate Body
Report, EC - Bananas III, 190, WT/DS27 (Sept. 25, 1997) stating that "like
products should be treated alike, irrespective of their origin.").
141. CARTERETAL.,Supra note 133.
142. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 308.
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apply. 143 For instance, GATT signatories may request waivers for
obligations that are difficult or impossible for the state to fulfill.
44
Additionally, states may impose safeguard measures to protect
domestic producers against serious injury.'45  Developing
countries, as well as customs unions or free trade areas (such as
NAFTA), may be exempt from certain GATT obligations. 46 The
fundamental principles and exceptions first set forth in GATT
remain at the forefront of the world's effort to liberalize trade. 4
7
The origin of the WTO lies in the GATT agreements. 48 Indeed,
the decisions, procedures, and customary practices of the GATT
remain at the core of the WTO. 149  While GATT enjoyed some
success with respect to the reduction of tariffs, its ability to control
the implementation of nontariff barriers was far less impressive. 5 °
As Professor John Jackson explained, "The world was becoming
increasingly complex and interdependent, and it was becoming
more and more obvious that the GATT rules were not
satisfactorily providing the measure of discipline that was needed
to prevent tensions and damaging national activity."''
Consequently, the United States and a few other countries pushed
for a new round of trade negotiations with a broad agenda
including discussion of new topics such as trade in services and
protection of intellectual property.'52 In September 1986, at Punta
143. CARTERET AL., supra note 133.
144. VAN DEN BoSSCHE, supra note 100, at 116. "One of the most important
waivers currently in force is a waiver of the MFN treatment obligation under
Article 1:1 of the GATT 1994, granted to the European Communities, with
respect to preferential tariff treatment given to products of African, Caribbean
and Pacific countries...." Id.
145. CARTER ET AL., supra note 133. ("The other country retains a right to
claim redress").
146. Id. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 662-67 (describing in
greater detail the exceptions relating to regional trading unions and developing
countries).
147. Id.
148. VAN DEN BOsSCHE, supra note 100, at 78.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 82.
151. Id. (quoting JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1998)).
152. Id.
362
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del Este, Uruguay, GATT contracting parties agreed to the start of
a new, broader round of trade negotiations. 53  The resulting
Uruguay Round would cover trade in services, including the
protection of intellectual property rights. 15
4
Although the need for institutional reforms to the GATT was
recognized at the outset of the Uruguay Round, ambitions toward
this end were limited.155 It was not until February 1990 that
Renato Ruggiero, who would later become the Director-General of
the WTO, "first floated the idea of establishing a new international
organization for trade.' 56  Canada then "formally proposed the
establishment of... a 'World Trade Organization', a fully-fledged
international organization which was to administer the different
legal instruments related to international trade, including the
GATT. . .and other multilateral instruments which were being
developed in the context of the ongoing negotiations.' 57  The
United States, however, was opposed to the creation of such a
powerful, centralized organization devoted to world trade.'58
Major trading nations were reluctant to submit to an organization
that may "t[ie] their hands."' 59 The prospect of entering into a
system of equal voting also discouraged powerful trading countries
from supporting the development of an international trade
organization. 6 °  Despite these challenges, in 1991, Canada,
Mexico and the European Community drafted a proposal for the
creation of an international trade organization. 6' The U.S.
remained opposed to such an organization: by 1993, it had become
153. Id.
154. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 83.
155. Id.
156. Id. (noting Mr. Ruggiero would later become the second Director-
General of the WTO).
157. Id. (citing TERRENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND
(Kluwer Law and Taxation 1933) (1944)).
158. Id. at 84.
159. Id. (citing John Jackson, Strengthening the International Legal
Framework of the GATT-MTN System: Reform Proposals for the New GATT
Round 1991, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 21 (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann
& Meinhard Hilfeds., 1991).
160. VAN DEN BoSSCHE, supra note 100, at 84.
161. Id.
363
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"increasingly isolated on the issue. 162 Perhaps as a result of this
isolation, on December 15, 1993, the United States formally
agreed to the establishment of the new organization. 63  The
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization was signed
in April 1994 and entered into force on January 1, 1995.,64
B. The WTO Structure
The ultimate goals of the WTO are an increase in the standard of
living for all of the world's people, the attainment of full
employment, the growth of real income, and the expansion of the
production and trade of goods and services. 6 5 In addition to these
broad and ambitious goals, the WTO sets forth, in its preamble,
two important concepts missing from the GATT: "The preamble
stresses the importance of sustainable economic development and
of the integration of developing countries, and in particular least-
developed countries, in the world trading system.' 6 6 Like GATT,
however, the WTO focuses on the reduction of trade barriers and
the elimination of discrimination as the means of attaining its
goals. 167
Perhaps most importantly, unlike GATT, the WTO has an
expansive infrastructure designed to implement and oversee the
functions and tasks assigned to it.'68 The institutional structure of
the WTO is a hierarchical system, consisting of various bodies and
committees.'69 At the highest level is the Ministerial Conference,
which enjoys general decision-making power, as well as a number
of specifically enumerated powers. 70 The second level consists of
162. Id. at 85.
163. Id. (providing insight concerning the political posturing that led to the
name change of the proposed organization from the Multilateral Trade
Organization to the World Trade Organization).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 86.
166. VAN DEN BOsSCHE, supra note 100, at 84.
167. Id. at 87.
168. Id. at 119-20.
169. Id. at 120.
170. See id. at 123. (listing specific powers such as adopting authoritative
interpretations of WTO agreements, granting waivers, adopting amendments,
364
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the General Council, the DSB and the Trade Policy Review Board
(TPRB).' 7 ' The lower levels are comprised of committees,
working parties, and specialized councils. 7 2 While the WTO's
structure may at first glance appear to mirror that of many large
multilateral organizations, important distinctions exist.'73 Notably,
the WTO does not have any permanent body through which
dialogue between the WTO, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and civil society may occur.'74 Further, the WTO lacks an
executive branch consisting of core members, that could "facilitate
the process of deliberation and decision making."'75 Despite these
limitations, the WTO provides the political structure necessary for
the negotiation of new policies, implementation of those policies
and dispute resolution between member states.
C. China's Accession to the WTO
China joined the WTO in 2001.'76 The negotiations that led to
China's accession were the most difficult and most important
negotiations in the WTO's history.'77The negotiations took almost
fifteen years and spawned a legal agreement of some 900 pages. 78
China was determined to join the WTO and accepted terms, that,
according to China expert, Nicholas Lardy, are "so onerous they
violate the fundamental principles of the WTO.' 79 In the decade
leading up to its WTO accession, China reduced tariff barriers so
dramatically that it had the least protection of any developing
decisions on accession and appointing Director-General and adopting staff
regulations).
171. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 120; see infra Parts E-F
(providing a more detailed examination of the role and function of the DSB).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also id. at 154-62 (providing a more detailed treatment of these
issues).
175. Id.
176. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
177. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 113.
178. Id. at 114. (noting that China began negotiations to enter the GATT
before the creation of the WTO).
179. Hughes, supra note 19. (quoting Nicholas Lardy, Institute for
International Economics).
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country in the world.'8 ° Incredibly, China abolished or amended
some 2,600 domestic laws in order to better comply with WTO
obligations. 8'
Most notably, China agreed to be considered a "nonmarket"
economy by other WTO members.'82 This label allows countries
accusing China of dumping goods to use surrogate prices from
WTO-designated market economies such as India, instead of
actual market prices in China, to make their case that China is
dumping goods.'83 Trade scholar Neil C. Hughes believes that
"[t]he procedure is at best arbitrary and at worst grossly unfair to
Chinese exporters."'84  China has begun approaching trading
partners, asking them to waive their "nonmarket" classification.'85
Although a dozen WTO members have agreed, the U.S. and the
European Union (E.U.) have so far refused.'86
In addition to the nonmarket economy designation, China's
accession agreement allows the U.S. to impose "safeguards"
against Chinese textile products.'87 China's accession agreement
permits safeguards to be implemented against its textile industry
whenever imports create or threaten to create market disruptions.'88
Without such an agreement, a state that wishes to impose
safeguard measures must demonstrate an increase in imports, a
serious injury, and a causal link between the imports and the
injury.'89 Safeguard measures are imposed in the form of customs
duties or quotas, and are designed to protect domestic industries
from the inflow of foreign goods.'90 The Agreement on Safeguards
180. Id.
181. Id. (noting that China also passed legislation on issues such as
intellectual property).
182. Id.
183. Id. see infra Part V(A) (arguing that the 'non-market' classification is
unwarranted).
184. Id. (citing the U.S.-China Business Council).
185. Hughes, supra note 19.
186. Id.
187. A Knotty Problem, supra note 31.
188. Id.
189. VAN DEN BoSSCHE, supra note 100, at 641.
190. Id. at 636.
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clearly requires that safeguards be applied on an MFN basis. 9 '
Accordingly, safeguards levied exclusively against Chinese goods
are in opposition to the principal of MFN, which forbids
restrictions against one country at the exclusion of others.'92 They
have, however, been employed against China's textile industry,
and may prove an integral feature in future trade negotiations
between the U.S. and China. 9 3
D. The Formation of the G20
In 2003, during the lead-up to the WTO's Ministerial
Conference in Cancun, Mexico, a new and powerful group of
developing countries banded together to demand the dismantling
of protectionist agriculture policies of the United States and the
European Community.'94 The group, known as the G20, includes
powerful developing nations such as China, India, Brazil, Egypt
and South Africa.'95 This alliance represents over half the world's
population and two-thirds of its farmers.'96 The G20 is powerful
and ambitious and it frames the debate in terms of rich versus
poor. "'97 G20 countries want an elimination of export subsidies,
substantially reduced domestic subsidies, and bigger tariff cuts by
rich countries. 9
8
E. An Overview of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
The dispute settlement system under GATT was not elaborate
and far from effective.' 99 Reform of the GATT system was a high
191. Id. at 638. (noting that there are exceptions to this rule, including if the
defendant member's exports are increasing disproportionately to the total
increase in imports of the complaining country).
192. Id
193. Textile Trade Politics: A Knotty Problem, supra note 31.
194. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 106-07.
195. Id. at 106.
196. Posturing in Cancun, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2003, at 67.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. VAN DEN BosSCHE, supra note 100, at 180.
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priority at the Uruguay Round."' The result of negotiations at the
Uruguay Round was the adoption of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which provides for an elaborate judicial
system governing world trade.20 ' The DSU created an
administrative organization, called the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), to implement the system.2 2 The system is charged with the
effective resolution of disputes between WTO members with
regard to their respective rights and obligations under WTO
treaties.2 3 The jurisdiction of the DSU is both compulsory and
exclusive."' Compulsory jurisdiction provides that any
complaining member must bring any dispute arising from an
alleged breach of WTO treaties to the WTO dispute settlement
system, and that any responding member must accept the
jurisdiction of the WTO.20 5  Exclusive jurisdiction prevents
unilateral action from being taken without the complaining country
bringing an action before the DSB.20 6 In other words, exclusive
jurisdiction prevents any country from acting independently to
redress a grievance.2"7
Once an action is initiated and jurisdiction is established, four
major steps may be required before the action is complete.20 8 The
first phase of dispute settlement in the WTO is known as
consultation.2 9 The main goal of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism is to achieve settlements agreed upon by both parties
through negotiation; this is known as consultation.2"' The DSU
itself states, "The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to
secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually
200. Id.
201. Id. at 181-82.
202. Id. at 228. (noting that the DSB has broad
system established in the DSU).
203. Id at 181-82.
204. Id. at 189.
205. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 189.
206. Id. at 190.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 203-04.
209. Id. at 203. (noting that consultation refers
negotiation as a way of dispute resolution).
210. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 183.
authority to implement the
to the emphasis placed on
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acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.""' Additionally, the
DSU emphasizes the quick resolution of disputes.21 2
If negotiations fail, a complaining party may then bring their
dispute before a panel for a panel proceeding.1 3 Panels are
comprised of three individuals, although the disputing members
may agree to amend that number to five.2 14 Panelists are usually
retired government trade officials with a background in law.2"5
Panel participants are selected by the disputing parties and
generally may not include nationals of any of those parties." 6 If a
party to the dispute is a developing country, the panel must include
at least one panelist from another developing country, if that party
so requests. 27  Generally, panelists are proposed by the WTO
Secretariat and may then be opposed by the parties.21 8 If the
parties are not capable of reaching an agreement on the panel's
composition, the Director-General may be called upon to appoint
the panelists. 2 9  The panel, once comprised, is charged with
reviewing the panel request (the complaint) and rendering a
decision. 2 ' The panel's scope of review is limited to the "terms of
211. Id. (quoting Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Article 3.7 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU Agreeement].
212. Id. (quoting, Article 3.3 of the DSU Agreement, which states, "[Prompt
settlement is] essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the
maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and the obligations of
Members.").
213. Id. at 204.
214. Id at 235. (noting that no panel of five has yet been established).
215. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 235.
216. Id. (noting that parties may agree to such appointments and that they
occasionally do).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 236. (noting that although parties are only supposed to challenge
potential panelists for compelling reasons, in practice parties often reject
panelists with little justification.).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 238.
369
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reference" set forth in the panel request.22" ' This limitation to the
terms of reference is important for two reasons:.
First, terms of reference fulfill [sic] an important
due process objective-they give the parties and
third parties sufficient information concerning the
claims at issue in the dispute in order to allow them
an opportunity to respond to the complainant's
case. Second, they establish the jurisdiction of the
panel by defining the precise claims at issue in the
claim.2 3
It is relevant here to note that an agreement outside the WTO
may not be added to the terms of reference.2 4 Once the panel has
been established and the terms of reference set, the panel is called
upon to determine the legality of the challenged measure with
respect to WTO law.225
The panel will then publish its findings in a panel report.226 If the
panel has determined that a party to the dispute is in violation of its
commitments under a WTO agreement, the panel recommends in
the panel report that the offending member bring themselves into
conformity with the agreement.227 These recommendations are not
221. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 237.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, 186,
WT/DS30 (Mar. 20, 1997)).
224. AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A VERY
SHORT INTRODUCTION, 90 (2005).
There are three kinds of complaints that may be brought
before the DSB. The first is for a breach of rules relating to a
WTO agreement. The second is a 'non-violation' complaint,
which alleges that the complaining member's benefit under a
WTO agreement is being impaired by measures taken by
another member. The third type of allowable complaint is
where a member's benefit under a WTO agreement is being
impaired by any other situation.
Id. [emphasis added].
225. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 237.
226. Id. at 242.
227. Id. at 243.
370
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automatically binding.2 28 They become binding only after they are
adopted by the DSB. 2 9 All that is required for adoption, however,
is the reverse consensus of its members.23 The reverse consensus
requirement dictates that a panel report will be adopted unless all
members agree not to accept the decision. 3' Panels may also make
suggestions about how to implement the necessary measures.232
Although these suggestions are not binding, they may have
considerable impact because the panel may later be called upon to
determine the success of the implementation.233
The losing party to a dispute may appeal the panel's finding in
the appellate mechanism of the DSB. 234 The appellate body is a
permanent body charged with the review of panel decisions. 35
After the appellate body receives and reviews an appeal, it has the
discretion to uphold, modify or reverse the panel report. 36
Appellate body inquiries are limited in scope to questions of law.237
Incentives to an appealing party, however, may be great. 38 An
appeal that proves unsuccessful allows the offending party to
continue its violations during the course of the appeal process.
239
Additionally, an appeal may have domestic political impact
because it can prove to domestic interests that the government has
exhausted all possible measures to protect domestic industry. z"
F. Remedies Under the DSB
There are three potential remedies available following a panel
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 229.
231. VAN DEN BosSCHE, supra note 100, at 229 (noting that in order for the
report not to be adopted, the winning country would have to vote against the
judgment).
232. Id. at 243.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 244.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 252.
237. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 250.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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decision. " ' The first of these remedies is the withdrawal of the
measure that violates VTO law.242 This remedy may also be
achieved by amending the offensive measure.243 If these measures
prove difficult to reform; the party has a reasonable period of time
to make the changes. " This reasonable time period will be
negotiated or created through binding arbitration.245  The
arbitration may be influenced by considerations such as whether
the state is a developing country and whether the changes may be
implemented in a practical and efficient manner. 46 Removal or
repair of the inconsistent measure is the only final solution to a
WTO dispute.247
International law has generally struggled to induce compliance
with legal obligations.248 Indeed, the enforcement of panel and
appellate reports has been problematic as well.249 Scholar Judith
Bello has suggested why:
The WTO rules are simply not 'binding' in the
traditional sense. When a panel established under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding issues
241. Id. at 217.
242. Id.
243. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 217.
244. Id. at218.
245. Id.
246. Id. at218-19.
247. Id. at 220.
248. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to 'Buy Out'?, 98 A.J.I.L. 117, (2004)
(providing an excellent summary of the lengthy scholarly debate over whether
WTO panel and appellate reports create international legal obligations).
Although Jackson notes that the remedies may be "deeply flawed", he argues
that the function of "a panel or... appellate report that rules that the laws or other
measures of a respondent nation are inconsistent with its WTO obligations is to
create an international law obligation to comply with that report...". Id. cf
Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is
More, 90 A.J.I.L. 416, 416-17 (1996);
249. Id. For a markedly different perspective on this debate, critiqued by
Jackson, see Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of
Renogotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S179 (2002) (arguing that the dispute settlement system
encourages "efficient breaches" of panel and appellate reports).
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a ruling adverse to a member, there is no prospect
of incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm
inflicted or police enforcement. The WTO has no
jailhouse, no bail bondsman, no blue helmets, no
truncheons or tear gas. Rather the WTO-
essentially a confederation of sovereign national
governments-relies upon voluntary compliance.25
If the losing party fails to voluntarily remove its measure, two
temporary remedies may be invoked.25" ' Compensation is available
but it must be agreed on by both parties, and thus, it is rarely
achieved.252 The suspension of concessions or other obligations by
the winning party, or the implementation of barriers, also known
as retaliation, is more common. 53 If the reasonable period of
implementation lapses, the injured party may employ retaliatory
measures against the violating party.254 This measure of last resort
may well prove injurious to both parties and should be avoided if
possible.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The TREA seeks to compel Chinese enforcement of intellectual
property rights through a list of demands, with a provision
authorizing a WTO dispute settlement action if those demands are
not met.255 The answer to the problem of intellectual property
protection in China is negotiation, but not negotiation through
250. Id. (quoting, Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Less Is More, 90 A.J.I.L. 416, 416-17 (1996)). Jackson points
out that Bello, in a subsequent article, clarified this argument stating that "the
WTO establishes binding obligations, although I continue to regard favorably
the [WTO]'s realistic recognition that it cannot enforce specific compliance."
Id. (quoting, Judith Hippler Bello, Book Review, 95 A.J.I.L. 984, 986-987
(2001)) (reviewing John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO).
251. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 220.
252. Idat 221.
253. Id. Retaliation may be the only way of compelling enforcement in
many cases. See generally, Jackson supra note 248.
254. Id. at 220.
255. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5 (2005).
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legislation. This part will illustrate the flaws in the Act's treatment
of the issues. Next, it will demonstrate that if the Executive
Branch does utilize the legislation, it will be to the detriment of the
U.S. Finally, the analysis will suggest that the way to protect U.S.
intellectual property rights in China is through negotiation and
teamwork.
A. The Act's Shortcomings
The TREA (1) fails to recognize the issues that prevent China
from enforcing its IP obligations. It does not set out goals and
guidelines with requisite specificity. It declines to compel action,
suggesting that the legislature wishes to use the TREA as a
bargaining chip not as authorization to bring in action in the WTO.
1. The TREA Does Not Address the Real Issues
Many of the TREA's provisions ignore the larger problems if
intellectual property enforcement and demand action that will
yield little or no actual results. The first measure on the TREA's
list of actions that China must implement provides a relevant
example. It reads in part, "[t]he Chinese Government has
increased the number of civil and criminal prosecutions of
intellectual property rights violators by the end of 2005 to a level
that significantly decreases the current amount of infringing
products for sale within China. 256 This demand is predicated on
the false assumption that an increase in the number of
prosecutions of intellectual property pirates will lead to a decrease
in the amount of infringing products. This assumption is incorrect.
As noted above, a Chinese piracy operation may simply re-open
following prosecution, and it is very difficult to acquire the
evidence necessary for legal action.257
Further, the TREA does not address the major evidentiary
obstacles that prevent effective litigation against Chinese pirating
rings, namely, that the burden is on the plaintiff to amass all
256. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(J) (2005).
257. See supra Part I(C).
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evidence necessary at trial before commencing an action.258
Additionally, there are no substantial penalties to prevent criminal
infringers from destroying evidence once they learn of a suit.
259
The TREA simply ignores these issues. Effective enforcement of
U.S. intellectual property rights in China will never be realized if
these evidentiary burdens are not reduced.
In addition to the massive evidentiary burden facing plaintiffs,
there is a larger and perhaps more troubling issue at hand: the lack
of cultural trade reciprocity between the U.S. and China. The
backbone of international intellectual property rights enforcement
is reciprocity. One perspective suggests that aggressively
combating criminal infringers makes little sense for China.Because
the Chinese do not export significant amounts of copyrightable
goods, there is little incentive for them to protect foreign
copyrightable goods. 26" Estimates suggest as many as 750,000
U.S. jobs are lost to counterfeit products, mainly from China.261
These jobs do not simply disappear. They are filled in China by
Chinese infringers. The result is a strong disincentive for China to
enforce U.S. intellectual property rights. The enforcement of these
rights takes jobs and goods, however illegal, away from China.
The TREA is unfortunately silent on this issue, when in fact, there
may be several steps the U.S. can take to help mitigate this
problem.
2. The Act Lacks Adequate Detail
Where the TREA manages to overcome these apparent
oversights, it suffers from a striking lack of specificity, coupled
with a lack of quantitative or qualitative measure of success. In
Section 5(J), it calls for the improvement of intellectual property
protection at trade shows and the issuance of new regulations
towards this end.262  It provides no measure of what may be
258. Ying Tuo, supra note 74.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 58.
261. 151 CONG. REC. H6658, 6660 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (Statement of
Rep. Rogers).
262. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(A) (2005).
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considered a significant improvement in these rights, and it asks
for the issuance of new regulations without regard to how or when
those regulations are to be implemented.
The TREA provides for a bilateral law enforcement group to
work on the problem of cross-border infringement, requiring that,
"The Chinese Government has established a bilateral intellectual
property rights law enforcement working group in cooperation
with the United States whose members will cooperate on
enforcement activities to reduce cross-border infringing
activities." '263 This provision suffers from at least two flaws. First,
the provision lacks specificity with regard to which U.S. offices
will be charged with coordinating with the newly formed Chinese
enforcement agency. Second, and more fundamentally, the
provision primarily targets cross-border infringement; although
this is significant, it ignores a critical phase of infringement- the
actual manufacture of infringing goods.
3. Negotiation Cannot Be Affected Through Legislation
The TREA is toothless because it provides an escape clause.
This shortcoming indicates the legislature's desire not to
implement the dispute settlement clause of the act. Instead, the
TREA appears to be list of demands, better suited for a negotiating
table than the floor of Congress.
The House's Democratic minority astutely attacked the TREA
for being long on rhetoric and short on substance: "It has no teeth,"
said Representative Louise Slaughter. 64 Slaughter's statement
cuts to the heart of the TREA's shortcomings. The relevant
provisions are aimed at monitoring China's implementation of the
legal framework discussed above. The legal framework, however,
means nothing without effective enforcement and the act provides
little in terms of compelling such enforcement. Representative
James McGovern summarized this sentiment: "[The TREA] is
largely symbolic. This bill is not tough. It is ineffective. 265
263. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(E) (2005).
264. Id.
265. Id. (statement of Rep. McGovern). Although Rep. McGovern's remarks
were directed generally toward the Act, they apply quite relevantly to the
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McGovern's allegations are supported by an examination of the
statutory language. It lists all the steps that should be monitored,
and mandates that the President act if they are not fulfilled; it then
provides a convenient backdoor for the Executive Branch to
excuse a lack of compliance:
If the President determines that the People's
Republic of China has not met each of the
obligations described in subparagraphs (A) through
(N) or taken steps that result in significant
improvements in protection of intellectual property
right then the President shall assign such resources
as are necessary to collect evidence of such trade
agreement violations for use in dispute settlement
proceedings against China in the World Trade
Organization.266
The TREA spells out fourteen affirmative steps that China must
take in order to forestall executive action, and then abandons these
requirements by providing the executive with an entirely
subjective test as to whether or not to follow through with the
action.
The TREA further states that China must comply with its
obligations under the JCCT.2 67 The WTO's dispute settlemetn
body however, may not here arguments based on China's alleged
violations of the JCCT. The JCCT is a bilateral negotiating
commmision.268 Since benefits that should accrue to the U.S.
under the JCCT are not benefits under a WTO agreement, no
complaint based on the loss of those benefits may be brought to
the DSB. 69
Finally, the Constitution grants the President the authority to
intellectual property portions of the Act.
266. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5 (2005).
267. Id.
268. The U.S. China Commission on China and Trade, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/World Regions/North Asia/China/US-
ChinaJCCT/SectionIndex.html?ht= (last visited April 15, 2006).
269. See supra note 224.
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serve as the Commander in Chief of the military, to make treaties,
and to appoint and receive ambassadors.27 The President's power
has been expanded beyond the explicit constitutional mandate to
encompass the general right to conduct foreign relations.
2 7
'
Implicit in this power is the right to bring an action on behalf of
the U.S. before the WTO. This right makes the TREA's grant of
power entirely unnecessary, further suggesting that the Act is
simply a list of demands, not an effective piece of legislation.
These errors may only be an oversight, but such mistakes indicate
lack of U.S. commitment to bring an action before the WTO.
These sections provide evidence of the legislature's desire to use
the TREA as a bargaining chip rather than a commitment to bring
an action before the WTO.
B. Potential Results of a WTO Action
Regardless of whether Congress intends to use this legislation as
a threat, or to actually bring China before the WTO for their
intellectual property rights violations, it will be ineffective. A
threat is only as influential as its possible effect and, put simply, a
decision by the DSB in favor of the U.S. would hurt both the U.S.
and China. Since China is in no position to immediately comply
with its obligation to enforce foreign IP rights, the only available
remedy would be a temporary one.272 If China is granted a
"reasonable period of time" to comply with the DSB's findings,
that period may be quite long. Regardless of the length, however,
it appears quite certain that the U.S. will end up in a position
where temporary remedies are authorized. Scholars Susan
Esserman and Robert Howse have noted this: "A losing state...
might have understandable domestic political reasons why it is not
able, for example, to overhaul a complex scheme of legislation in
the short or medium term." '273 Esserman and Howse conclude that,
270. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Two-thirds of the present Senate must
concur. Id.
271. CARTERETAL.,supra note 133, at 193.
272. See supra Part IV F.
273. Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 137.
378
34
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol16/iss2/5
2006] ANSWERS FOR IP ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 379
if a losing party in such a situation fails to comply with a ruling, a
panel may award the winner the right to retaliate.274
Temporary remedies come in two forms: compensation and the
suspension of concessions.275 Since compensation requires both
countries to agree on a number, it is rarely utilized. 76 It would
appear that any successful action by the U.S. would result in the
WTO authorizing the U.S. to take retaliatory steps against China.
Such an outcome is undesirable because (1) it will adversely effect
both the U.S. and China, (2) it will not help to change China's
inability to enforce IP rights, (3) it will increase tension in the
already delicate trading and political relationships between the
U.S. and China, and (4) it will lead directly to a decrease in the
liberalization of trade, an outcome in direct opposition to the
policy goals of the WTO.
1. For Every Action...
A threshold problem for the U.S., if granted authority to retaliate
by the WTO, is that the U.S. must determine where to focus its
retaliatory measures. Article 22.3 of the DSU provides that the
retaliating country should seek to levy sanctions upon the same
sector or industry whose domestic counterpart is being harmed.277
This will pose a substantial problem with respect to the creative
industries harmed by piracy because the U.S. does not import
substantial amounts of Chinese cultural goods.278 The DSU further
provides that if it is "not practical or effective" to retaliate against
the same sector, the retaliating party may retaliate against a sector
covered by the same agreement-TRIPS in this case.279 Finally, if
274. Id.
275. See supra Part IV F.
276. See supra IV F.
277. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsue.htm (last visited April 1,
2006).
278. See supra section I C.
279. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/28-dsu-e.htm (last visited April 1,
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a sanction against a sector under the same agreement is "not
practical or effective", the retaliating party may retaliate against a
sector in any other WTO agreement.28 ° At the very least, the U.S.
will have a serious domestic political struggle on its hands
because, whatever Chinese sector the U.S. decides to target, the
American companies with which it trades will inevitably object.
As far back as Adam Smith, economists have noted that
retaliation, with respect to trade barriers, harms the retaliating
country as well.' Indeed, Smith pointed out that where there is
little hope of retaliation affecting a change: "[I]t seems a bad
method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our
people, to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes,
but to almost all the other classes of them." '82
Examples of such harms pervade the history of trade sanctions.
In the now-famous WTO cases, Bananas and Hormones, the U.S.
imposed high tariff barriers on imports from the European
Community (E.C.).283 As a result, the U.S. consumers of the
targeted E.C. products suffered a loss of choice and had to pay
higher prices for substitute products.284 Imposing high tariff
barriers or quotas on Chinese goods or services would have similar
effect: the injurious effect of trade sanctions on domestic
consumers may well defeat any advantages gained from the
pressure the sanctions exert on China.
In light of the U.S. trade deficit with China, it is clear that many
U.S. companies rely on Chinese imports, and that those companies
would suffer from the imposition of trade sanctions against
China.285 U.S. consumers and importers might not be the only
losers, Jeffrey A. Bader, director of the China Initiative at the
Brookings institute explained the dilemma: "Suppose we imposed
2006).
280. Id.
281. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L.
792, 815 (2001).
282. Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 296 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1776)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See supra Section I B.
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some severe sanctions on Chinese goods. Well, the Chinese
companies exporting to the United States are mostly foreign-
owned, so you would be hurting those companies, and profoundly
hurting the rest of Asia ... 286 In fact, nearly 60% of U.S. imports
from China are produced by foreign firms, many of which are
American.287 Congress must be cautious when looking to impose
trade sanctions on China as the consequences may be more far-
reaching then anticipated.
2. Creative Industries Create Enforcement
If the U.S. is able to effectively target China's creative
industries, those sanctions would do little to fix the real problems
that prevent China from enforcing intellectual property rights;
instead, they would contribute to the problems. China must
continue to develop and improve its legal system over time in
order to properly enforce intellectual property rights. China must
also improve its infrastructure in order to effectively prosecute
criminal infringers and keep those infringers from reopening after
successful prosecution, as is often the case.288 The reform of these
institutions requires the Chinese creative industry to be capable of
lobbying for change from within China. Trade barriers related to
cultural imports will inhibit the growth of China's cultural
industries. Trade barriers would have a detrimental effect on
emerging Chinese cultural industries as they would increase the
price to Chinese exporters and deter foreign investment in China's
creative industries. It is these very industries that, if allowed to
prosper, will be at the heart of the solution to the problem.289
There is reason to be optimistic about the development of
286. Paul Blunstein, Fighting Words Belie Trade Reality: U.S. Makes
Demands on China but Lacks Power to Force Change, WASH. POST, April 18,
2006, at DOI (quoting Jeffrey A. Brader, Director of the China Initiative at the
Brookings Institute).
287. Hughes, supra note 19.
288. Ying Tuo, supra note 74.
289. Lawrence Van Gelder provides the relevant example of Hong Kong's
film industry looking to the mainland government to increase protection of IP
rights. Lawrence Van Gelder, Hong Kong's Film Slump, N.Y. TIMES., May 3,
2005, at E5.
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China's creative industries. As China has shown its willingness to
address problems of IP enforcement, investor confidence has
grown.29° Lei Jun, the head of Beijing's Kingsoft Company, which
develops software products, announced that the company will
invest several million dollars in further product development. 9'
Lei stated, "The amendment of the Copyright Law and China's
accession to the [WTO] have enhanced our confidence in doing
business." '29 2 Foreign investors are taking note as well. Indeed, a
thread of irony runs through the fact that U.S. companies may well
play a significant role in the development of China's creative
industries. American entertainment companies are excited about
the potential opening of China's market.293 A December 2005
article in the Los Angeles Times summarized the thought process
of studio executives: "All those people (a fifth of humanity!).
Ready to be entertained. Open to American culture. If just a
fraction of them went to the movies-once a month, say, and
maybe bought a spinoff toy or video game. . . well, do the
math." '294
As capital is invested in China's creative industry (whether
through domestic or foreign channels) and that industry grows, so
does its ability to promote intellectual property rights. The process
is reciprocal; investment in creative industries leads to stronger
intellectual property protectiorn--stronger intellectual property
protection leads to increased investment in those industries. The
imposition of trade sanctions on China's creative industries, or
industries related thereto, will only forestall the development of a
necessary prerequisite to protecting intellectual property rights in
China.
3. The Balance Must Be Preserved
WTO sanctions cannot be viewed in isolation from the problems
290. Crack Down on Copyright Cheats, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 22, 2004.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Bruce Wallace, Crouching US. Studios, Hidden Chinese Markets, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2005, at El.
294. Id.
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that pervade U.S-China trade relations. Currently, disputes exist in
areas including agricultural subsidies, currency manipulation, the
flight of labor from the U.S., the textile industry, and human
rights.
China is not without leverage. Peter Yeo, a top aide on the U.S.
House of Representatives International Relations Committee
sounded a note of caution: "There's a real staying power to this
relationship that wasn't there before. We need [China] as much as
they need us." '295 In fact, China's consumption of U.S. treasury
bonds has allowed the U.S. to continue to keep spending in times
of economic hardship.296 A significant withdrawal of Chinese
investment in the U.S. could send interest rates soaring and the
U.S. economy reeling. 97 Additionally, if the U.S. is not careful,
they may well miss out on an unprecedented period of growth.
China has flexed its muscle before. In response to the
imposition of safeguard quotas against Chinese textiles, China
removed concessions in the form of export tariffs that were
designed to stem the flow of textiles into the U.S.298 Although the
removal of these tariffs may not fundamentally alter the structure
of U.S.-China trade relations, "[t]he reason to worry... is that the
textiles spat is part of a broader, more dangerous, rise in trade
tension with China." '299 Any further trade restrictions imposed by
the U.S. would undoubtedly have consequences, and those
consequences may well be severe.
In addition to the troubled trade relation, the political issue of
Taiwan looms large over the landscape of U.S.-China relations. As
Wang Jisi states, "[w]ar between China and the United States over
Taiwan would be a nightmare, and both sides will try hard to avoid
it."3 ' Separatists in Taiwan, who receive support from certain
members of the U.S. defense establishment as well as certain
members of Congress, continue to push for independence.3"' If a
295. Edward Alden et al., Mistrust and Mutuality: Why U.S.-China Links are
Now in Flux, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at 11 (quoting Peter Yeo).
296. Looming Trade War, supra note 21.
297. Id.
298. A Knotty Problem, supra note 3 1.
299. Id.
300. Wang Jisi, supra note 42, at 46.
301. Id.
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conflict does occur, these parties will be to blame.3"2 The solution
to this conflict must come through dialogue: "Chinese and U.S.
government agencies and their foreign policy think-tanks should
launch a sustained and thorough dialogue on the issue and explore
"5303ways to prevent separatist forces from making a rash move...
Any consideration of U.S.-China trade relations must take into
account the delicate political balance over the issue of Taiwan, for
a mistake on either front could destroy any progress on the other.
4. The Push for Protectionism
An April 2005 article in the Economist noted that "[t]he pressure
toward protectionism in Washington is strong and could put in
further danger not only trade with China but also the wider climate
for trade liberalization in the Doha round of the World Trade
Organization."30 4 If the U.S. brings an action against China before
the DSB, the result could be a standstill in negotiations at the next
round of WTO negotiations. The main goal of the WTO is to lift
trade barriers by removing discrimination and thereby increase the
quality of life throughout the world.30 5 Unfortunately, as eminent
trade lawyer Steve Charnovitz points out, "[a]nother problem with
trade sanctions is that they foment the sort of domestic
protectionist pressure that the WTO was set up to constrain. 30 6
Indeed, domestic protectionism is growing in the U.S.3"7 If the
protectionists win and further sanctions are imposed, the result
could be to halt negotiations on intellectual property rights
altogether. It is negotiation, however, that is necessary to remedy
the problem of intellectual property rights protection in China.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. The China Question; History, Riots and Trade Rows, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 23, 2005, at 12.
305. VAN DEN BoSSCHE, supra note 100, at 86.
306. Charnovitz, supra note 281.
307. China-Bashing and Trade, supra note 26.
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C. Potential Solutions
As a threshold matter, the bilateral negotiations advocated in this
analysis and WTO consultation must be distinguished. Since,
January 1, 1995, 335 requests for consultations have been made in
the DSB.30 8 Out of those 335 requests, only 50 have been resolved
by "mutually agreed solution.""3 9 This 14.93% success rate cannot
be considered a great success in the light of the fact that the WTO
places such great emphasis on resolution through consultation."'
Several reasons may explain why WTO consultation remains
largely ineffective. First, the DSU provides that after only sixty
days of consultation, a complaining party may ask for a panel to be
established. 31' Also, the parties may, by agreement, request the
establishment of a panel before the expiration of the sixty-day
term. 3 2  Alternatively, bilateral negotiations have no set time
frame offering more flexibility as new developments arise.
Second, the threat of litigation in the DSB may forestall good faith
negotiations as tensions rise and domestic political pressures lead
to tough rhetoric and posturing. Bilateral negotiations, on the
other hand, may be conducted more amicably without the
imminent threat of litigation.313 In the case of IP rights, the U.S.
must focus on mutual advantages rather then differences.
Although one may argue sanctions will create incentives to
enforce intellectual property rights where there were previously
none, such incentives should be offered in the form of further trade
308. Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV26, Mar. 1,
2006, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/ov.pdf (last visited April
15, 2006).
309. Id.
310. DSU Agreement, supra note 211, Art. 3.7. (stating that "[a] solution
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute... is clearly to be preferred [to
litigation]"). This author calculated the 14.93 percent rate by dividing the 50
successful cases by the 335 total cases which yields approximately 0.01493 or
14.93 percent.
311. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 100, at 258.
312. Id.
313. This is not to suggest that countries that solve differences in a bilateral
negotiation will not have recourse if the agreements made are breached. In
practice, countries include provisions for binding arbitration in the event of a
breach.
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concessions for compliance, not trade sanctions for
noncompliance. These incentives may only be attained through
bilateral negotiation. Negotiated concessions, as opposed to
sanctions will have a positive effect on domestic markets;
concessions will further liberalize trade to the benefit of the U.S.
economy. The U.S. must come to the conclusion that China is not
working against it; specifically, it must realize that China is not a
currency manipulator and does not intentionally dump goods on
the U.S. market.
The U.S. must set a place at the negotiation table for China.
China is not the only contributor to the bilateral trade gap, and its
reputation for currency manipulation and the dumping of goods is
unwarranted. China appears willing to work with the U.S. to
improve enforcement. Finally, there may be potential solutions for
U.S. companies whose products are exploited by criminal
infringers and intellectual property pirates in China today.
1. The Trade Deficit Is Not the Result of China Dumping Goods
Nor Manipulating Currency
Trade protectionists argue that the trade deficit between the U.S.
and China is the result of China's trade policies." 4 While the
accusation is not without merit, the trade deficit results from a
number of factors, including U.S. practices. In 2005, the U.S.
spent 57% more than it earned in international trade." 5 The
problem is not necessarily how much the U.S. is spending, but
why it is spending." 6 Foreign money is being used to build homes,
purchase consumer goods, and finance the increasing federal
budget deficit. 1 7 Domestic savings rates tell a similar tale. New
314. China-Bashing and Trade, supra note 26.
315. Paul Krugman, Debt and Denial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at A23.
316. Id.
317. Id. Krugman explains that:
Sometimes large-scale foreign borrowing makes sense. In the
19th century the United States borrowed vast sums from
Europe, using the funds to build railroads and other industrial
infrastructure. The debt-financing left America stronger, not
weaker. But this time overseas borrowing isn't financing an
investment boom.. .business investment is actually low by
386
42
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol16/iss2/5
2006] ANSWERS FOR IP ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA
York Times columnist Paul Krugman astutely observed, "[p]eople
[in the U.S.] who already own homes, are treating them like
ATM's, converting home equity into spending money; last year
the personal savings rate fell below zero for the first time since
1933."38 Negative savings rates translate to domestic budget
deficits, which in turn contribute to the trade gap. The United
States must consider its role in the trade deficit before levying
accusations against China.
Protectionists argue that China illegally dumps goods on foreign
markets, leading to increased trade deficits.3 9 Additionally, China
is still considered a "non-market" economy by the U.S., which
allows the U.S. to impose restrictions on Chinese imports by
comparing the prices of Chinese goods to the prices charged in
other developing country's economies. 320  A policy that allows
countries to use surrogate prices to show dumping, effectively
allows accusing countries to prove dumping where there is none.
Actually, China's low import prices are due in large part to the
opening of its massive economy.32" ' Neil C. Hughes provides a
relevant example:
Under China's planned economy, many provinces
and large cities had their own TV manufacturers.
When the economy opened up, overall capacity far
exceeded demand and competition become
cutthroat. The result: an all-out price war that has
been going on for over a decade, reducing the price
of a color TV in China by an astonishing 80
percent in the first five years alone. Now the
historical standards.
Id.
318. Id.
319. Hughes, supra note 19; The WTO states that dumping goods "occurs
when goods are exported at a price less than their normal value, generally
meaning they are exported for less than they are sold in the domestic market or
third-country markets or at less than production costs." WTO Glossary,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/glossarye/glossarye.htm
(last visited April 1, 2006).
320. Hughes, supra note 19.
321. Id.
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winners of that race are penalized for their success:
in early 2004, Washington decided to apply
antidumping duties of up to 78.5 percent on import
of Chinese color TVs with screens 21 inches or
larger.1
2
The opening of China's economy has been accompanied by an
unleashing of market forces that will disrupt the balance of trading
power for many years to come. The U.S. cannot expect these
forces to be channeled smoothly into world financial markets.
China, on the other hand, must take responsibility and work to
mitigate damages to its future partners as it grows.
The second major accusation protectionists have levied against
China is that China is a currency manipulator.123 While there may
be some truth to the accusations, several factors contribute to the
problem, many of which are beyond China's control.
Protectionists point to China's huge stockpiles of foreign reserves
as proof of currency manipulation.324 A comparison of per capita
foreign reserves suggests China does not hold reserves
disproportionate to its population. China's per capita foreign
reserve is $606; comparatively, Taiwan's per capita foreign reserve
is $9,817 and Japan's is $6,654.325 China's per capita foreign
322. Id.
323. China-Bashing and Trade, supra note 26. The GATT Agreement
mandates that parties dealing with problems regarding "monetary reserves,
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements" consult with the
International Monetary Fund. GATT 1947 Article XV (2). IMF Article IV
section I prohibits parties from manipulating exchange rates to gain unfair
competitive advantages.
324. Hughes, supra note 19.
325. The CIA World Fact Book estimates that China's foreign reserve
holdings are just over 795 billion dollars. Japan and Taiwan's foreign reserve
holdings are estimated at 845 billion and 225.8 billion respectively. Population
estimates for China, Japan and Taiwan are, rounded to the nearest millionth,
1,313 million, 127 million and 23 million respectively. This author then took
those numbers and calculated, by dividing the population into the reserve
holdings and rounding to the nearest dollar. All population estimates are from
2006. China and Taiwan foreign reserve estimates are from 2005 and Japan
from 2004. All statistics used are available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html (last
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reserve is dramatically less then those of its neighbors and U.S.
trade allies, Taiwan and Japan. In light of this information it
appears that China's large stockpiles of foreign reserves are due in
large part to China's massive population.
China's capital inflows demonstrate that China is not
intentionally using excess foreign reserves to manipulate exchange
rates. In fact, much of China's growth has been funded by foreign
direct investors who pour foreign currency into China. As much
as 60% of all Chinese exports to the U.S. are made by foreign
companies, many of which are American.32 6  Additionally,
American companies are purchasing Chinese goods at an
insatiable rate. Wal-mart, for example, purchased $18 billion of
Chinese goods in 2004.327 The investment of foreign currency and
large-scale purchases of Chinese goods by American companies
help keep China's foreign reserve stockpiles high. Put simply,
China is the biggest national market in the world, and competitors
want in on the ground floor.
Protectionists also argue that the reason for the increasing trade
gap with China is China's policy of pegging the yuan to the
dollar.328  The yuan, however, is not undervalued in world
markets.329  The trade gap is not the result of currency
manipulation, but instead results from the fact that China's
economy can afford to import as many goods as it needs while
continuing to out-compete all other countries in the world export
market.330 Additionally, China's large purchases of U.S. treasury
bonds require the conversion of yuan to dollars on world financial
markets, which keep the price of the yuan down relative to the
dollar.'
So where does this controversy come from? One reason for the
criticism is rooted in China's use of capital controls, which serve
visited April 1, 2006).
326. Hughes, supra note 19.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id
330. Id.
331. Looming Trade War, supra note 21. The U.S. must be especially
careful here as China's purchase of U.S. Treasury Bonds contributes to the
value of the dollar and keeps inflation in the U.S. down. Id.
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to keep inflation down. 3 2 To its credit, China has begun to remove
some of these controls. Recent steps by the Chinese government
include allowing the use of foreign exchange to buy foreign assets,
allowing insurance companies to invest their premiums overseas,
and allowing individuals to take foreign currency out of the
country.333 The transition of China into an open market economy
will be one of trial and error. Like any new marriage, the U.S. and
China must use their common goals and interests to overcome the
obstacles before them. Accusations and name-calling should not
be substituted for reason and respect.
2. China and the U.S. Can Work Together
The TREA focuses on monitoring and potentially bringing legal
action against the Chinese for failure to comply with its
standards. 334  The U.S. must not ignore previous and potential
future successes that result from working with the Chinese to
better enforce intellectual property rights in China. To be sure,
previous attempts at such bilateral cooperation have shown initial
indications of success. This issue is, at least, preliminarily
addressed in the act, which provides:
The Chinese Government has appointed an
Intellectual Property Rights
Ombudsman at the Chinese Embassy in
Washington, D.C., to serve as the point
of contact for United States companies, particularly
small and medium-sized
businesses, seeking to secure and enforce their
intellectual property rights
in China or experiencing intellectual property rights
problems in China.335
Section 1, however, only addresses the need for the private
332. Hughes, supra note 19.
333. Id.
334. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(1) (2005).
335. Trade Rights Enforcement Act, H.R. 3282, 109th Cong. §5(1)(I) (2005).
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sector to communicate with Chinese officials with regard to the
protection of their rights in China. A provision providing for the
appointment of a Chinese official charged with the responsibility
of working with U.S. intellectual property officials would better
serve the community as a whole. Such an appointment would
provide U.S. officials with an avenue to communicate their ideas
for better enforcement with China. Additionally, such an
appointment may be influential in making China more accountable
for violation of U.S. intellectual property rights.
U.S. authorities have enjoyed some success when working with
developing countries in the past. The United States Copyright
Office is a key player in compelling foreign performance with
respect to the prevention of piracy.336 The Copyright Office works
diligently in the training of foreign copyright officials to help
address enforcement issues abroad. 37 The Copyright Office has
created a program for the training of foreign officials, known as
the International Copyright Institute (ICI).338 The ICI offers week-
long seminar courses to foreign copyright officers and makes its
experts available for conferences and speeches worldwide.339 The
ICI thus employs a two-pronged approach to aid in enforcement by
educating foreign officers as well as working to strengthen
relationships with foreign countries.34 °
Additionally, the Commerce Department began taking positive
steps toward enforcing U.S. intellectual property rights in
September 2005."4' As part of the plan, the Commerce Department
will send experts to several developing countries, including China,
to monitor piracy and counterfeiting cases.34 The plan also calls
for seminars for American small businesses on how to protect their
rights abroad, as well as training programs for foreign officials.343
The private sector has been quick to commend the government
action. Lezler Westine, executive director of TechNet, a Silicone
336. Hearing, supra note 2.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Flynn, supra note 1.
342. Id.
343. Id.
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Valley based lobbying group stated, "[p]rotecting IP rights is
extremely important to our industry... The steps they are taking
are very comprehensive." '344
The ICI and Commerce Department programs focus on working
with foreign officials to combat piracy. Only time will tell if the
programs will succeed or fail; but the move toward working
together must be seen as positive in light of previous failures to
enforce American intellectual property rights abroad. Indeed, the
development of the programs may well reflect the need to
encourage enforcement through education and teamwork, not
strong-arm tactics.
U.S. agencies have worked with China successfully in the past.
When China joined the WTO in 2001, the Copyright Office
worked with a United States Trade Representative led team to
provide advice and to urge the Chinese leadership to amend its
laws to comply with TRIPS.345 Although the amendments to
Chinese law cannot be called a terrific success, according to U.S.
Registrar of Copyrights Marybeth Peters, the new laws "[are] more
than sufficient to provide some meaningful protection to
copyrighted works if it is properly enforced." '346 These successes
apply primarily to the legal framework side of the problem. The
fact that China was willing to accept U.S. help and incorporate
these changes, however, opens the door, at least theoretically, to
U.S. agencies working with China toward increased enforcement.
For these reasons, the U.S. must focus on negotiation, not
litigation to solve the problem of intellectual property rights
enforcement in China.
CONCLUSION
What can U.S. intellectual property right holders do if they want
to do business in China? To a large extent, they will be on their
own. One technique, suggested by Yin Tuo of China's Dragon
Law Firm, is for the company to engage the infringers as a client.
Acting as a client, a U.S. company can gain access to the
344. Id (quoting Lezler Westine).
345. Hearing on Piracy, supra note 2.
346. Id.
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infringer's techniques without the infringers realizing they are
being investigated. The collection of evidence against infringers is
the most critical step toward successful prosecution of those
infringers. 347 Therefore, U.S. companies are well advised to begin
collecting evidence at the very first sign of infringement
activities.348
Because of the strict evidentiary standards in Chinese courts, the
maintenance of the evidentiary chain is of critical importance;
companies should be sure to maintain all relevant data regarding
transactions and operations of the infringers.349  During the
collection of evidence, it is imperative for the U.S. company not to
alert the Chinese infringers that the company is investigating.35°
Such notice likely results in the destruction of evidence, most
likely coupled with the moving and renaming of the counterfeiting
or pirating operation, leaving the U.S. company back at square
one. 351  When enough evidence has been gathered, effective
counsel in China must be hired.
The problem of intellectual property enforcement in developing
countries costs U.S. industries billions of dollars each year. The
TREA provides a plan to deal with the problem. The plan is
wholly inadequate and encourages negotiation through
intimidation. After carefully analyzing its merits, its potential
effect on Chinese intellectual property enforcement and the
problems of U.S.-China trade relations generally, it is clear the
TREA proposes an ineffective remedy. The Senate should vote it
down and instead look to the USTR, the Copyright Office, and the
Commerce Department to negotiate improvements in China's
347. Ying Tuo, supra note 74.
348. Id. (suggesting that when collecting electronic evidence, such as
emails, U.S. companies do not download emails to their local server but instead
use a third party server such as Yahoo.com, in order to preserve the authenticity
of such evidence as well as to prevent the infringers from becoming wise to the
collection of evidence).
349. Id. (suggesting that detailing who, when, where, and from whom all
correspondence occurs, as well as keeping all letters, confirmations, shipping
documents, shipping packages, invoices, etc. will help to preserve the necessary
chain of evidence).
350. Id.
351. Id.
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intellectual property enforcement. Futher, Congress must
recognize that trade liberalization-not protectionism--will
provide the necessary incentives to compel better enforcement.
The success or failure of U.S.-China trade may well steer the
course for the future of world trade and politics for decades to
come. A relationship based on trust and negotiation will not be
fostered if a lack of understanding continues. Compromise must
be the rule of the hour.
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